Michigan Law Review
Volume 64

Issue 7

1966

Products Liability--Some Observations About Allocation of Risks
Page Keeton
University of Texas

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Consumer Protection Law Commons, Law and Economics Commons, and the Torts
Commons

Recommended Citation
Page Keeton, Products Liability--Some Observations About Allocation of Risks, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1329
(1966).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol64/iss7/9

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

PRODUCTS LIABILITY-SOME OBSERVATIONS
ABOUT ALLOCATION OF. RISKS
Page Keeton*
I.

INTRODUCTION

scientific and technological revolution through which our
society is proceeding is accompanied by vast changes in existing
products as well as a proliferation of new products, notably with
respect to drugs, cosmetics, and other chemical products. For example, it has been noted that three fourths of the prescriptions written
by doctors in the United States today are for drugs and vaccines
which were unknown in 1950.1

T

HE

Barely a generation ago, a doctor's little black bag contained
only a small number of effective drugs. In it were a few pain
remedies, anesthetics, and antitoxins. His bag might also have
contained mercury, quinine, digitalis, iodine, and opium in
one form or another. All of these medications have been known
for hundreds of years. They were the same ones, with few exceptions, that might have been used in treating an ailing
Shakespeare.... But after the discovery of the first sulfa drug
in the Thirties, a doctor's medical kit became a treasury of
new drugs that helped to heal, to cure and to save lives. With
this discovery, the world entered the age of chemotherapythe treatment of disease with chemical agents. 2
It might also be said that it is an age of chemocosmetology-the
improvement of the appearance through treatment of the skin and
hair. Many of the new products and so-called improvements in existing products are beneficial when viewed from the standpoint of the
general good. Often, however, the benefits to the many come at a
high cost to the few, for there are increasingly more opportunities
for mishaps, not only in the manufacturing process, but also in the
marketing and use of the finished products.
Today a great many more persons tha.n. ever before are being
victimized by the dangers inherent in the use of consumer durable
goods as well as products intended for intimate bodily use-foods,
drugs, and cosmetics. This substantial increase in the incidence of
unintended harm occurring in the course of, or as a consequence of,
the use of products, together with the enhanced social concern for
the victims of our modern devices, is bringing about a reexamina• Dean and Professor of Law, University of Texas.-Ed.
I. National Observer, May 3, 1965.
2. Address by Edward D. Downing, Peculiar Problems in Pharmaceutical Cases, at
Legal Institute, University of Arkansas, Oct. 1965.
·
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tion of the principles formerly utilized by the courts for shifting
losses. A prerequisite to the shifting of losses on a tort theory has
commonly been a finding of fault on the part of the manufacturer
or other seller. Until recently, moreover, contractual obligations,
the bases of which are to be found in the commercial codes of the
various states, have been limited largely to the parties to the sales
or sales contracts and have been regarded as obligations that the
parties could alter by clearly stating in their written agreements
their intention to do so. As the scope of liability increases, orthodox
contractual principles of freedom of contract are being qualified,
and fault as a prerequisite for shifting losses on a tort theory is being abandoned. As might be expected, when substantial changes are
made in the law, and especially when the change is effected by the
judiciary by means of a case-by-case- development rather than by the
legislature, there is much uncertainty as to the ultimate extent of
the change. The uncertainty is enhanced with regard to the liability
of makers and sellers of products because the recent expansion of
the scope of their liability has been the result of the application of
two competing, but not necessarily inconsistent, theories-warranty
and strict tort.3
Virtually all of the activities of mankind involve the use of some
product. Consequently, nearly all losses in the nature of physical
damage to persons or things, and a great deal of the economic losses
flowing from inferior or unfit products, are factually caused by characteristics or conditions of products, or at least occur during the
use of products. Therefore, when fault, in the sense in which fault
has been used in the Anglo-American law of torts (a usage which frequently results in the imposition of liability without personal fault),
is abandoned as a basis for shifting or allocating losses, some rules
and principles must be substituted in its place in order to delimit
liability; othenvise, the result would be a revolutionary scheme, involving the imposition of all losses on the makers of products as a
class rather than upon the ultimate purchasers as a class. It has been
suggested that something similar to this may indeed occur.4 Even
now, if it must be shown that the harm resulted from a defective
condition of a product, some courts have assumed the existence of
3. See Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1965) (war•
ranty theory); Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. App. 2d 67, 377 P,2d 897
(1963) (strict tort theory); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A,2d
69 (1960) (warranty theory); Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432,
191 N.E.2d 816 (1963) (strict tort theory); Shanker, Strict Tort Theory of Products
Liability and the Uniform Commercial Code: A Commentary on Jurisprudential
Eclipses, Pigeonholes and Communication Barriers, 17 W. REs. L. REv. 5 (1965),
4. Cowan, Some Policy Bases of Products Liability, 17 STAN. L. REV. 1077 (1965).

May 1966]

Products Liability-Allocation of Risks

1331

a defective condition from (1) the unexplained occurrence of an
accident in the course of an allegedly careful use of the product,
and (2) the often unreliable testimony of an injured user that he
was careful in the handling and use of the product. This practice
lends support to the proposition that, realistically, the maker of the
product is a risk distributor for all losses other than those attributable to certain known causes. 5 This problem will be discussed in
more detail below, since the attitude of the courts concerning questions of proof and sufficiency of evidence is as important as are the
substantive rules for defining the "risks" to be borne.6

I!.

THE .ARGUMENTS FOR STRICT LIABILITY

Avoidance of circuity of action has often been asserted as a justification for warranty liability without privity of contract. The warranties of merchantability and of general fitness for the purposes
for which the product was made have long been imposed under
sales law on the maker and other sellers in favor of an immediate
purchaser in order to compensate him for economic harm. 7 Such a
warranty, however, has not been universally imposed on the retail
seller for the benefit of the ultimate consumer or user when the
specific object was available for inspection and when the sale was
not regarded as a sale by description. 8 Moreover, liability for physical harm under such a contractual or warranty obligation did not
necessarily follow from the fact that the product was unsuitable for
the purposes for which it was made. Thus, the abandonment of the
privity requirement as a basis for recovery, whether done on strict
tort theories or on warranty theories, constitutes a greater change
than can be justified merely by the advantages derived from the
avoidance of circuity of action. The issue, in fact, is not the avoidance of circuity of action, but rather the decision when and to whom
a loss should be shifted.
The abandonment of privity as a requirement for recovery on
warranty theories has also been supported by the argument that, as
a practical matter, the ultimate purchaser or user is dealing with the
maker who markets under a trade name and advertises nationally,
and that resellers of all kinds are simply conduits, albeit separate
5. Evangelino v. Metropolitan Bottling Co., 339 Mass. 177, 158 N.E.2d 342 (1959)
(bottle explosion incident to allegedly careful use); Bronson v. Hudson Co., 135 N.W.2d
388 (Mich. 1965) (dermatitis followed wearing of cotton slip).
6. See part IV infra.
·
7. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CoDE § 2-314.
8. See HONNOLD, SALES AND SALES FINANCING 60-63 (1954); Ruud, The Vendor's
Responsibility for Quality in the Automated Retail Sale, 9 KAN. L. REv. 139 (1960).
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legal entities, for distribution to the users.9 Therefore, the obligations, whatever they might be, should run directly from the manufacturer to the purchaser-consumer, despite the indirect marketing
process. Consistent with this approach, the warranty provisions of
the Uniform Commercial Code have generally been interpreted to
allow recovery in the absence of privity of contract.10 But this analysis does not answer the questions relating to the liability of those
entrepreneurs, other than the maker, who are involved in the marketing and distribution process, and it does not define the extent
of the warranty or the legal obligations of the manufacturer.
The warranty of merchantability, and thus liability without
fault, has often been explained on the theory of a tacit representation by silence; the maker tacitly represents that his product is
fit for its general purposes, and the purchaser assumes that the product is what it purports to be. 11 Proof of the purchaser's reliance on
such a representation is, of course, not necessary. The maker represents only that he has utilized reasonable manufacturing practices
and has exercised reasonable skill and care in supplying his product
to the public. No one assumes perfection in any maker's process.
Indeed, it is well known that a few products coming off an assembly
line will not be safe or fit for their intended uses, even when the
utmost care is ·exercised. A product which is unfit for the purpose
intended, however, frustrates consumer expectations, and a product
that is dangerous for use as intended frustrates expectations regarding its safety. It may be argued that harm resulting from the frustration of consumer expectations as to a product's qualities or safety
for use should be shifted to the maker as a cost of doing business.
This use of the criterion of frustration as a justification for the imposition of liability has a tremendous impact on the extent and
nature of strict liability. For example, the user of cigarettes is no
longer unaware of the dangers of smoking; he elects to take a chance
in order to enjoy the benefits of smoking. If frustration of consumer
expectations as to the nature and quality of the product were the
only basis for shifting losses without fault, recovery would be limited to only those consumers who had no kno,vledge of the risk.
Stated generally, the rule would be that a consumer assumed any
9. Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., 133 N.W.2d 129 (Mich. 1965) (defective gun
-bystander allowed recovery); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161
A.2d 696 (1960).
IO. See generally Comment, The Contractual Aspect of Consumer Protection: Re•
cent Developments in the Law of Sales Warranties, 64 MICH. L. REv. 1430, 1442•52
(1966).
11. See generally James, Products Liability, 34 TEXAS L. REv. 192 (1955); Prosser,
The Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 MINN. L. REv. 117 (1943).

May 1966]

Products Liability-Allocation of Risks

1333

risk of which he was aware before his injury. This conclusion was
clearly stated in one of the recent cases involving lung cancer caused
by cigarette smoking. 12
The reduction of the incidence of harm resulting from unfit and
unsafe products is often stated to be one of the reasons for the imposition of liability without fault on the maker and other sellers.13
However, there are several problems with this argument. First, this
rationale would frequently not justify imposing liability on resellers,
since they may have no opportunity to discover the conditions that
might produce the harmful results. The reseller's liability can generally be supported only by the theory that he is a convenient conduit for transmitting a loss to the maker, but the conduit argument
is often a very doubtful justification. Second, the desire to reduce
accidents justifies shifting losses to a manufacturer only if he could
have eliminated a condition of the product that ought not to have
existed. Consequently, liability should not be extended to makers
for harm resulting from unavoidable injurious effects of highly
desirable products, such as good penicillin, good cigarettes, or good
whiskey. In addition, it is doubtful whether strict liability induces
greater care than does negligence liability. 14 Moreover, if strict liability does induce greater care, it can be argued that it will also tend
to inhibit the development of new products.' Thus, the importance
of the development of new products may be a factor to be considered
in establishing the limits of strict liability.
The principal reason now widely accepted for shifting losses
from consumers to manufacturers is that those engaged in the manufacturing enterprise have the capacity to distribute the losses of the
few among the many who purchase the products. The assumption is
that the manufacturer can shift the loss to the consumers by charging
higher prices for the products. 15 In fixing limits to the legal liability
of makers based on this view, in conjunction with the discussion
above, it would obviously seem desirable for the courts and legislatures to consider other existing ways for shifting or guarding
12. Pritchard v. Liggett&: Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1965); Cintrone
v. Hertz Truck Leasing, 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965) (lessor absolved from liability
because of user's contributory negligence in using truck with knowledge of defect),
13. Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. App. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944);
Jacob E. Decker &: Sons v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W.2d 828 (1942). But see the dissenting opinion by Judge Burke in Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d
432, 191 N.E.2d 81 (1963).
14. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69
YALE L.J. 1099, 1119 (1960).
15. Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. App. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897 (1962);
Suvada v. White Motor Co., 201 N.E.2d 313 (Ill. App. 1965); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 696 (1960); Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument
Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81 (1963).
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against losses. For example, the availability of, as well as the practices of acquiring, _insurance is quite important. Since nearly every
head of a family, with the exception of the indigent, protects himself and his dependents by means of life insurance, it may be undesirable to shift losses from wrongful deaths to makers without regard
to this widespread use of life insurance.16 Also significant is the fact
that employees of industrial and commercial users of products are
already covered by workmen's compensation, and thus a satisfactory
compensation scheme might be an answer to the problem of distributing losses attributable to physical harms suffered in the course of
their employment. Such a, plan would eliminate the costly and timeconsuming task of identifying the cause of an accident, such as an
explosion that occurs during the use by one enterpriser of an oxygen
cylinder supplied by a second enterpriser and an acetylene torch
furnished by a third. 17 In these situations, the users of the products
are fully capable of assuming and distributing losses.
III. THE R.IsKs To BE

ALLOCATED

Harm, whether it takes the form of an economic loss or a physical injury to persons or property, can occur for a variety of reasons
because of, during, or following the use of a product. 18 First, the
harm may have resulted, despite careful and proper use, from an unintended condition of the product that made it different from products of like kind made by the same manufacturer. Such an occurrence is frequently referred to as a miscarriage in the manufacturing
process. Most of the leading cases applying principles of warranty or
strict liability since the landmark case of Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc., 19 have involved harm resulting from such unintended
16. There is a conflict as to whether wrongful death statutes in the various states
can be interpreted so as to permit. recovery without fault. The language of most of
the statutes provides for recovery when an injury causing the death of a person is
caused by a wrongful act or neglect. Some courts have held that the wrongful death
statute creates a cause of action only when the defendant's conduct constitutes a tort
arising out of negligence. See Whiteley v. Webb's City, Inc., 55 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 1951);
Howson v. Foster Beef Co., 87 N.H. 200, 177 Atl. 656 (1935); Di Belardino v. Lemmon
Pharmacal Co., 208 A.2d 283 (Pa. 1965). Others have permitted a recovery: Dagley v.
Armstrong Rubber Co., 344 F.2d 245 (7th Cir. 1965); Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument
Corp., supra note 15.
17. An employee-user recovered on strict liability theories against the supplier of
an oxygen cylinder in Delta Oxygen Co. v. Scott, 383 S.W.2d 885 (Ark. 1964). Employees of an industrial user also recovered in Brewer v. Oriard Powder Co., 401 P.2d 844
(Wash. 1965), involving a premature explosion of dynamite. On the other hand, recovery was denied in Barlow Protective Mut. Ins. Co. v. DeVilbriss Co., 214 F. Supp.
540 (E.D. Wis. 1963).
18. A list of some of these reasons has been set forth heretofore by the author.
Keeton, Products Liability-The Nature and Extent of Strict Liability, 1964 U. ILL.
L.F. 693, 695.
19. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 696 (1960).
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conditions. Examples of these conditions are the defective steering
wheel of the automobile in Henningsen, the defective altimeter of
the airplane in Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 20 the inadequate set screws in the power tool in Greenman v. Yuba Power
Products, Inc., 21 the defective fork stem in Putnam v. Erie City Mfg.
Co.,22 and live virus in polio vaccine. 23 If liability without fault and
without privity of contract is ever to ·be imposed on makers, it should
be applied to compensate for injuries resulting from these or similar
unintended conditions. Indeed, courts have quite generally recognized a miscarriage in the manufacturing process as a proper risk
to be allocated to the manufacturer.
According to the Second Restatement of Torts, 24 an unintended
and defective condition that arises during manufacture subjects the
maker to strict liability on a tort theory if the defective condition
is one that makes the product "unreasonably dangerous." 25 Some
courts, by their use of language such· as "imminently dangerous,"
imply that the· test is whether the unintended condition made the
product so dangerous that a reasonable man, with knowledge of the
condition, would not have sold it as it existed. Thus the issue becomes whether the maker would have been negligent in selling such
a product with knowledge of its condition. Assuming that the same
defenses are available to a maker under the strict tort theory as are
available to him when liability is imposed on a negligence theory,
the only significant difference between the two approaches is that
with a strict liability theory the injured party is relieved of the necessity of proving either that the defective condition was negligently
created or that the maker or other seller knew of the condition or
20. 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81 (1963).
21. 59 Cal. App. 2d 67, 377 P.2d 897 (1963).
22. 338 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1964).
23. Gottsdanker v. Cutter Labs., 6 Cal. Rptr. 320 (Ct. App. 1960).
24. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 402A (1965):
(I) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
, change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
,
· (a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
25. Keeton, Products Liability-Liability Without Fault and the Requirement of
a Defect, 41 TEXAS L REv. 855, 859 (1963); Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 14 (1965). See also Keeton, supra note 18, at 702, where it is suggested that "unreasonably dangerous" means that the. product must have been "so
dangerous to the user in the condition that it was in that a reasonable man would
not have sold it in such condition with knowledge of such a condition and appreciation of the danger."
·

1336

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 64:1829

should have discovered it in the exercise of ordinary care. Since one
or both of these elements of a negligence action have frequently
been inferred merely from proof of a defective condition, no revolutionary change has been effected by the imposition of strict tort
liability for miscarriages in the manufacturing process.
A second type of risk is that a product may be wholly unsuitable
for its purpose and yet not be unsafe to the user. When the issue
concerns the liability of a maker or other seller for physical harm,
the question for the jury is not whether the product was unmerchantable in the sense of having been unfit for its purpose, but
rather whether the product was unreasonably dangerous to the consumer. It is submitted that courts should not confuse the jury by
using language of "unfitness" when what is meant is "danger." A
dangerous condition may very well be regarded as making a product
unfit, but it is the magnitude of the danger that is the decisive issue.
Minor defects should not result in liability.
Another distinct type of risk is exemplified by losses resulting
from a condition of a product that was characteristic of all the maker's products of that same kind. That is, the product was exactly as
it was intended to be and was properly used for the purposes for
which it was designed, but harm nevertheless resulted. In some cases
there may be a finding that the product was unreasonably dangerous
in that it was designed improperly or made with ingredients that
were too harmful, and that the imperfections were scientifically discoverable. In order to support recovery on a negligence theory, it
would have to be established that the magnitude of the danger outweighed the usefulness of the product and that a reasonable man
in the position of the maker should have appreciated the imbalance
when the product was sold.26 There would of course be differing
opinions as to how much the manufacturer should have discovered
of that which was scientifically cognizable.27 If strict liability is applicable, there is no necessity for showing that, as a reasonable man,
the maker should have had knowledge of his product's unsafe qualities. It is sufficient if, after accidents have occurred, it appears to
have been an unreasonably dangerous product. Here again, nothing
revolutionary has been achieved by imposing strict liability on
makers. It can be argued that this type of liability will induce a
26. See Noel, Manufacturer's Negligence of Design or Directions for Use of a
Product, 71 YALE L.J. 816 (1962).
27. For cases involving this problem, see Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc. v. Barker, 228
F.2d 842, 848-49 (1st Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 988 (1956); Braun v. Roux Distrib. Co., 312 S.W.2d 758 (Mo. 1958); La Plant v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours &: Co., 846
S.W.2d 231 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961). See generally Keeton, Products Liability-Problems
Pertaining to Proof of Negligence, 19 Sw. L.J. 26 (1965).
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manufacturer to exercise greater care before he changes the design
of a mechanical product or makes a new chemical product. Furthermore, it would be reasonable to expect that the consumers of the
products would be fully capable of bearing such losses in the form
of higher prices.
The approach must be different when the unreasonably dangerous nature of the product was not scientifically discoverable at the
time the product was sold. This is not uncommon with drugs and
other chemical products, for the full extent of the dangers involved
in the use of some drugs cannot be known until there has been a
period of use by human beings. Sometimes the side effects are not
of sufficient seriousness and frequency to warrant withdrawal of
the drug from the market, but at other times they are. For example,
MER-29 was made and sold as an anti-cholesterol drug. Considering
the rate of heart disease, it looked as if it would be a most significant
product. The drug, however, produced serious side effects, including
cataracts; and has been withdrawn from the market. 28 A substantial
number of cases are· pending against the maker. In one case the
court held that the manufacturer was liable for the tragic consequences incurred by a few victims before it was discovered that the
drug was so dangerous. 29 Similarly, in Lartigue v. Reynolds Tobacco
Co.30 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit took the position
adopted in the Second Restatement of Torts3 1 that the manufacturer
of cigarettes did not warrant against undiscoverable risks of contracting lung cancer from the use of cigarettes. These are both situations
where by hypothesis no amount of care would have disclosed the
fact that the products were unreasonably dangerous. Since the products were in fact dangerous, the issues here are whether the victims
of an experimental process are to be compensated and, if so, by
whom.
Another problem, distinct from those considered above, is that
of the allergic user. It is known that nearly all cosmetics and drugs
will result in substantial harm to a certain percentage of persons.
Injuries from drugs and cosmetics do occur to hypersensitive and
allergic persons, even when proper care is exercised in the use of
the products and there are adequate instructions and warnings con28. See Downing, supra note 2.
29. Cudmore v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 398 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
30. 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1963).
31. R.EsrATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 402A, comments j &: k (1965). According to
comment j, there is no duty to warn of danger unless "by the application of reasonable, developed human skill and foresight" the maker would have discovered the
danger.
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cerning their use. 82 Assuming that these facts were established about
a particular drug or cosmetic and that a, plaintiff is shown to have
suffered an allergic reaction to the product, should the maker be
required to absorb the losses arising from such a reaction on the
theory that he can do so as a cost of doing business? The decisions
are in conflict with respect to the makers of cosmetics.88 As to drugs,
however, it does not appear that an allergic user has recovered absent proof of some negligence on the part of the manufacturer, either
in failing to give proper instructions for the use of the drug or in
failing to warn adequately about the dangers presented by it.84
Numerous other situations could arise in which an injured plaintiff might allege that a particular product, although properly made,
was "defective." A few of these instances will be mentioned below
in order to demonstrate that each situation presents a different risk
and hence a different problem of risk allocation. First, the product
may be mishandled by the user-for example,, a negligently driven
automobile. Second, the product may be misused by being inappropriately used for a purpose other than that for which it was made.8 1S
Third, the product, although used for an appropriate purpose, may
be overused, as in the case of a prescription drug which produces an
adverse reaction when excessive dosages are used. Fourth, a proper
use of the product may involve the user in an accident caused by
the activity of a third person using a different article, such as might
occur in a collision between two airplanes. Fifth, the use of the product, although proper, may lead to injury to the user through the intervention of an unforeseeable force of nature, as in the case of an
airplane crashing in a storm. Obviously, any of these situations may
also arise _in conjunction with a defective product; for example, an
excessively caustic hair dye may be used by a consumer who negligently fails to follow directions as to its use.86
32. See Whitmore, Allergies and Other Reactions Due to Drugs and Cosmetics, 19
SW. L.J. 76 (1965).
33. Jacquot v. Filene's Sons Co., 337 Mass. 312, 149 N.E.2d 635 (1958) (fingernail
polish-no liability); Reynolds v. Sun Ray Drug Co., 135 N.J.L. 475, 52 A.2d 666 (Ct.
Err. & App. 1947) (lipstick-liability); Bennett v. Pilot Prods. Co., 120 Utah 474, 235
P.2d 525 (1951) (permanent wave lotion-no liability); Esborg v. Bailey Drug Co., 378
P.2d 298 (Wash. 1963) (hair tint-liability).
·
34. For a case containing a complete charge to the jury on the subject of adequacy
of warning regarding the dangers involved in the use thereof, sec Cornish & Cornish
v. Sterling Drug, - F. Supp. - (D.D.C. 1965).
35. See Gibson v. California Spray Chem. Corp., 29 Wash. 2d 611, 188 P.2d 316
(1948) (apple crop destroyed by chemical spray).
36. Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir, 1965) (volun•
tary exposure to known risk would bar recovery but contributory negligence without
actual knowledge of danger would not); Maiorino v. Weco Prods. Co., 45 N.J. 570,
214 A.2d 18 (1965) (contributory negligence barred recovery by plaintiff who suffered
lacerated left wrist in opening glass container).
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.ALLOCATION OF LOSSES FROM UNKNOWN CAUSES--BURDEN
OF PROOF AND SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

Each of the above situations presents a somewhat different risk
or hazard, and indeed each can be further refined. However nar-rowly described, the issue in each case is how best to allocate the
particular kind of loss among victims, users, retailers, distributors,
assemblers, manufacturers of component parts, and enterprisers
other than those involved in the manufacture and distribution of
the product. There is, however, one other situation that should not
be overlooked: a loss may occur under circumstances which make
it impossible to ascertain its "cause" or "causes." The holdings of
courts with respect to the allocation of the burden of proof and the
sufficiency of the evidence to meet the burden frequently pose major
problems in the area of products liability. If a court concludes, as a
matter of substantive law, that a manufacturer i's not liable for a
loss resulting from the use of his product except when the loss arises
from a "defective" condition, and that the burden of proof is on the
injured claimant to establish the existence of such a defective condition, it is readily apparent that the po~ition of the court with respect to the nature and quantum of proof required to justify a finding of a "defective condition" as a ·cause of the harm is of utmost
significance. The imposition on a maker of strict liability, rather
than liability based on negligence, for harm resulting from "defective conditions" does not alter the main issue: proof of the existence
of a defective product.37 Even if negligence is the only basis for recovery, proof of the existence of a defective condition at the time
possession of the product was surrendered by the manufacturer frequently serves as a basis for an inference of negligence and for the
application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, for if the defect in the
product existed at that time, it is most likely to have been caused by
the manufacturer, quite possibly as the result of negligence.38
Issues involving the sufficiency of the evidence which justifies a
finding of a defective condition in a mechanical product are quite
different from those presented when the products involved are intended for intimate bodily use, such as food, drugs, and cosmetics.39
However, without regard to the nature of the product, the fact that
37. Keeton, supra note 27.
38. Lewis v. United States Rubber Co., 414 Pa. 626,202 A.2d 20 (1964) (severed wire
bead in an automobile tire caused blowout); Standard Motor Co. v. Blood, 380 S.W.2d
651 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964) (brake cylinder clogged with pieces of inner lining of flexible hose).
39. The major difference arises from the fact that unintended injury often flows
from allergic reactions as well as from defects in such products.
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injury occurs during or shortly following the use of a product does
not normally justify a finding, either by the trial judge or the jury,
that the plaintiff's injury resulted from an accident attributable to
a defect in the product. Thus, the crash of an airplane does not, in
and of itself, indicate that the airplane was defectively made, and
when a car swerves off the road and crashes into a brick wall, it is
more probable that the accident was caused by the driver's negligence than by a defect in the automobile. A chemical burn following the use of a hair dye that is by nature highly caustic does not,
in and of itself, imply that the product was defective, any more than
it implies misapplication by a beauty parlor operator, or an allergic
or hypersensitive victim. No doubt there will be developed rules and
principles which take into consideration the type of product; indeed,
some have already been developed with regard to the nature and
quantum of evidence required to justify the allocation of a risk to a
maker of a product. These principles are based either on the theory
that the maker should be liable for harm resulting from unknown
causes or on the theory that the cause was sufficiently established.
These rules cannot be overlooked as part of the process for the distribution and allocation of risks.
The foregoing observations may be illustrated by some examples.
In Henningsen, the only evidence (at least the only evidence noted
in the appellate opinion) of a defect in the new automobile that
swerved off the road and crashed into a wall was the testimony of
the driver that, without warning, there had been a loud noise from
underneath the hood and that something appeared to have cracked.
She testified that the steering wheel then spun in her hands and the
automobile went out of control.40 Of course, if there had been an
investigation of the wreckage by an expert who could have identified
a condition of the steering mechanism that was probably the cause
of, rather than caused by, the accident, such evidence would generally be regarded as sufficient, not only to establish a defective condition, but also to establish that the maker was negligent either in
creating or in failing to discover the condition. In the absence of
that kind of evidence, the trial judge, concluding that a prima facie
case of negligence had not been established, dismissed the negligence
count but permitted the case to go to the jury on a warranty theory;
this, action was affirmed on appeal.
It is submitted that if the manufacturer is liable only when it is
established that his product was defective, then the same proof is necessary to establish his strict liability for the defect as is necessary to
40. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 696 (1960).
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show negligence, since the latter can be inferred from a defective condition. In some cases, of course, it has been held that the testimony
of a user indicating that an identifiable component of a product had malfunctioned was sufficient to establish a defective condition as well as negligence. 41 This is an understandable and reasonable position, but it should be noted that such evidence is frequently
unreliable, especially in the absence of an explanation of why such
a defect was unidentified after the accident. In cases involving a car
swerving off the road without explanation, some courts have inferred, and no doubt quite correctly, that the driver was negligent.42
The question is therefore whether, if the accident is one that, without explanation, points to user negligence or error of judgment, the
user's testimony of (1) his own proper conduct in the use of the product and (2) a malfunctioning of the product should justify the allocation of losses resulting from such an accident to the manufacturer.
Practical problems in the fact-finding process are involved here, and
principles of both liability and proof, to be theoretically sound, must
take account of these problems. To question the probative value of
the user's testimony is not to say that harm from accidents resulting
from unknown causes should not be allocated to the maker of the
product. However, if the cost is to be allocated to the manufacturer
of a particular product, it should be so allocated not on the basis of
the technical legal rationales which have been developed to justify
the shift, but rather on the basis of a policy decision which recognizes the superior ability of the maker to bear the loss. Thus, there
is a substantial difference between the claim of the ordinary consumer who suffers injury during or after his use of a product and
the claim of one injured as a result of the use of a product in the
performance of a service by a professional or an entrepreneur such
as an airline, a beauty parlor operator, or a physician.
To illustrate the importance of the questions involved in the
allocation of losses from unknown causes, and to demonstrate that
the theory for the allocation of risk is often not so important as the
position of the court regarding the sufficiency of the evidence to establish the existence of a defective condition, attention is directed
to an opinion of an intermediate appellate court in California approving the action of the trial judge, who at the close of the evidence
dismissed a warranty count brought by the owner of a building
41. Testimony of brake failure has been regarded as sufficient for inferring the
probable presence of a defect when possession of a car was surrendered by its maker.
Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 391 P.2d 168 (1964); Comstock v.
General Motors Corp., 358 Mich. 163, 99 N.W.2d 627 (1959).
42. Reibert v. Thompson, 302 Ky. 688, 194 S.W.2d 974 (1946); Etheridge v. Etheridge, 222 N.C. 616, 24 S.E.2d 477 (1943).
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against the maker of a heat pump for an air conditioning unit. At
the same time, the appellate court reversed the trial judge's refusal
to recognize the applicability of res ipsa loquitur to the plaintiff's
negligence theory.43 A fire had broken out in a so-called plenuma wooden box through which the heat pump propelled hot and cold
air:. Vents in the plenum directed hot and cold air to the rooms in
the building. The defendants were the contractor who installed the
air conditioning equipment and the maker of the heat pump. The
appellate court concluded that, although the trial judge's finding as
to the insufficiency of the evidence to establish a defective condition
of the heat pump should not be disturbed, it would not have been
inconsistent with that finding for the judge to have inferred negligence on the part of either or both defendants pursuant to the res
ipsa loquitur doctrine. It would appear difficult to justify a finding
of negligence against the maker of the heat pump without also finding a defective condition, and the latter finding would be the only
requirement for strict liability. This case is mentioned simply to
demonstrate the importance of rules pertaining to proof of negligence and proof of defective conditions in the allocation of risks.
As a practical matter, the liability of suppliers of cosmetics, drugs,
and other products intended for ,intimate bodily use may be expanded more by rules pertaining to the sufficiency of the evidence
to establish a defective condition than by the rejection of the usual
requirement of negligence or fault as a basis for shifting a loss. When
injury occurs during the use of a drug or a cosmetic, the harm may
be explained by factors other than the existence of a defective condition of the product. The victim may have suffered from an allergic
reaction because of a sensitivity that he normally has to a particular
substance, or he may have been suffering from a hypersensitivity
caused by a temporary abnormal condition, such as an illness. Another possibility is that the product may have been so inherently
toxic that an overdosage, an overuse, or a misuse would have adversely affected most people. It follows, therefore, that even when
the injury occurs in such a way as to demonstrate conclusively that
the victim's reaction was caused by the product, it is not necessarily
more likely that the reaction was due to a defective condition than
that it was due to misuse or hypersensitivity. Thus, in Hanrahan v.
Walgreen Co.,44 the court held that plaintiff could not recover for a
chemical burn suffered after the use of a hair rinse because there was
"no evidence ... that the hair rinse contained any poisonous or dele43. Greening v. General Air Conditioning Corp., 43 Cal. Rptr. 662 (Dist. Ct. App,
1965).
44. 243 N.C. 268, 90 S.E.2d 392 (1955).
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terious ingredient to a normal person who used it." 45 Similarly, in
Benavides v. Stop b Shop, Inc., 46 plaintiff was denied recovery for
an injury to her eye following the use of soap. The court, making it
clear that plaintiff had not established that the product was defective
by merely showing an injury following use, remarked that no evidence of a chemical analysis of the product had been introduced to
establish the existence of an irritant which would have made the
product defective.
On the other hand, in John A. Brown Co. v. Shelton,47 plaintiff
recovered for damages resulting from a chemical haircut and burns
following the application of a product known as "Tint 'N Set." No
chemical analysis of the particular product was given in evidence,
but the user testified that the material was "off color" and that the
hair gummed and matted when it was applied. Likewise, the Michigan Supreme Court recognized that there was sufficient evidence to
establish that a defective condition of a slip was a cause for plaintiff's dermatitis without proof of an identifiable harmful substance in
the slip.48 In that case, plaintiff claimed that severe dermatitis had
been caused by an irritant in the slip and that the emotional stress
that ensued had triggered a heart attack. The majority concluded
that a legitimate inference could be drawn from plaintiff's-proof that
an irritant was present in the cloth and, while recognizing that evidence in rebuttal by the defense might well refute the plaintiff's case,
reversed the trial judge's dismissal of the action. The dissent, however, indicated that the result was indeed novel unless one was prepared to say that use plus injury equals a prima facie case of liability.

v.

NATURE OF HARM AND TYPE OF PURCHASER

In developing a system of rules and principles for the allocation
of the risks of harm involved in the use of products, especially ~s between purchasers and manufacturers, several courts have suggested
that distinctions ought to be made among the various types of losses
which a claimant seeks to shift to someone else. While many of the
same principles will and should ultimately apply regardless of the
nature of the loss, there are persuasive reasons for making some distinctions among different types of harm, at least until the effect of
the imposition of strict liability can be more satisfactorily evaluated.
There are at least four feasible categories of harm: (I) physical injury to persons; (2) physical damage to tangible things other than
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 270, 90 S.E.2d at 394.
190 N.E.2d 874 (Mass. 1963).
391 P.2d 259 (Okla. 1963).
Bronson v. Hudson Co., 135 N.W. 388 (Mich. 1965).
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. the product itself; (3) physical harm to the product itself; and (4)
commercial or economic losses which involve no physical harm and
which are occasioned by the unfitness of the product, either for
the specific purpose of the user or for the general purposes .!or which
the product was made and sold.
Seely v. White Motor Company 40 is a leading case in which the
distinction between commercial losses and physical harm is explained
both by the majority and the concurring opinions. The claimant,
who was engaged in the business of heavy-duty hauling, purchased
from a retail dealer a truck manufactured by the White Motor Company. Shortly after he acquired the truck, the plaintiff discovered
that it bounced violently, an action known as "galloping." For eleven
months the retail dealer and the manufacturer's representatives
made unsuccessful attempts to correct the defect, and ultimately the
truck overturned. Although no one was injured, two claims were
made: a claim of $5,466 for physical damage to the truck arising out
of the accident and a claim of about $20,900 for economic and commercial losses, including payments on the truck and lost profits suffered during the period of the truck's defective performance. At the
time of purchase, the plaintiff had signed a document that included
the usual manufacturer's warranties and disclaimers. It was found
at the ·trial that the accident was not caused by the galloping characteristic of the truck, and so the liability of the maker for physical
damage to the truck was not in issue.
Chief Justice Traynor, in the majority opinion in Seely, took
great pains to develop the theses that "the law of sales has been carefully articulated to govern the economic relations between suppliers
and consumers of goods," 60 and that the commercial codes adopted
in mo~t of the states should therefore be regarded as the source for
ascertaining the rights and obligations of those in the distributive
chain. Thus, the law concerned with liability for commercial losses,
including questions relating to the validity and effect of disclaimer
clauses and to the liability of makers and distributors to those who
either are not in the distributive chain at all, such as bystanders, or
are not in privity of contract in a marketing sense, should be developed independently of the law involving claims for physical damage
either to persons or tangible property. The latter claims are to be
governed in California by the rules and principles of tort responsibility, rather than by warranty or contractual theories. However,
since virtually all courts recognize that the implied warranty of merchantability or general fitness of the product for its intended pur49. 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 403 P.2d 145 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
50. Id. at 21, 403 P.2d at 149.
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poses is an obligation imposed by law on the seller and is a species
of strict liability which does not depend on the seller's expressed intention to be bound, it would appear to be relatively immaterial
whether the theory for the imposition of liability, either for commercial losses or for physical harm, is regarded as tortious or contractual. This is not to say that the rules and principles set forth in
the commercial codes primarily for the purpose of shifting commercial losses should be transferred in toto to damages claims for physical harm. In the Second Restatement of Torts, 51 the American Law
Institute adopted a principle of strict tort liability but limited its
application to cases involving physical harm, on the assumption that
the commercial codes should be interpreted so as not to prevent the
development of rules and principles for allocating physical losses
among victims, makers, and other sellers of products. Thus, the distinction made in Seely follows the ideas set forth in the Second Restatement.
Other courts have recognized the significance of this basic distinction between commercial losses and physical damage. The Oregon
Supreme Court recently adopted the position of the California Supreme Court, justifying its decision by pointing out that courts have
frequently overlooked fault and privity requirements in cases involving physical injuries to persons because the "hazard to life and
health is usually a personal disaster of major proportions to the
individual, both physically and financially, and something of minor
importance to the manufacturer or wholesaler against which they can
protect themselves by a distribution of risk through the price of the
article sold. " 52 In this particular case, the court held that a wholesaler of a tractor would not be liable to an ultimate purchaser for
commercial losses arising from the tractor's defective construction.
Historically, in cases based on tort theories of liability, the determination of (1) the kind of fault, if any, necessary to subject an actor
to legal liability, (2) the ambit of his responsibility for the remote
and unintended consequences of his acts, and (3) the class of p~rsons
to whom he is liable, has been governed by different legal rules and
concepts depending on whether compensation was sought for physical
injury or for economic loss. Numerous examples could be given, but
two should suffice. Negligent conduct that prevents the performance
of a contract does not normally subject the actor to liability for the
economic loss to the promisor resulting from his inability to perform his contract. 53 Likewise, one who innocently, albeit negligently,
51. Section 402A.
52. Price v. Gatlin, 405 P.2d 502 (Ore. 1965).
53. Donovan Constr. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 133 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1955),
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induces another by his misrepresentation of fact to make a disadvantageous contract is not subject to liability for the economic loss
suffered by the representee. 54 On the other hand, few persons would
question the proposition that a negligently uttered false statement
calculated to induce the kind of reliance that was in turn likely to
cause physical injury should and does subject the representer to liability. The distinction between an actor's liability £or economic loss
and his liability for physical harm has been carefully made throughout the Second Restatement. This distinction arises not only from
legal history, but also because the problems of recovery for economic
loss and for physical injury differ in many ways. For example, the
kinds of questions that are involved in deciding whether a retail
druggist, as a maker of drugs, should be held liable to the victims
of MER-29 55 are quite different from those which arise when an
adhesive purchased from a chemical company fails to hold glass window panes in place, and the contractor is forced to replace several
thousand panes at great expense.56
This is not to say that certain critical observations in Justice
Peters' concurring opinion in Seely 51 are not worthy of thoughtful
consideration in determining the best allocation of risks among victims, users, and the various links in the manufacturing and distribution processes. Justice Peters' position was that the majority unduly
feared that if the same strict liability rules were made applicable to
economic losses as are applied to physical injuries, "the manufacturer
would be liable for damages of unknown and unlimited scope."" 8
He believed that it was not the nature of the damage but rather the
nature of the ultimate transaction and the relative roles played by
'the parties in the distribution and use of the product that were important. This writer would not exclude those considerations because
they may often be of greater importance than the nature of the damage. In fact, the following additional considerations are also rele8 STAN. L. REv. 725 (1956). The leading case is Lumley v. Gye, 2 E. &: B. 216 (Q.B.
1853).
54. Derry v. Peek, [1899] 14 A.C. 337. Some courts have held parties to the contract
strictly accountable for economic loss resulting from misstatements of fact, but this
type of responsibility has been limited to parties to the contract and has the same
economic effect as rescission, since the parties are restored to status quo. Aldrich v.
Scribner, 154 Mich. 23, 117 N.W. 581 (1908).
55. See McLeod v. Merrell Co., 114 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 1965). The court held that a
retail druggist would not be strictly accountable and there was some indication that,
as regards an experimental drug such as this, the maker would not be held liable.
See text accompanying note 28 supra.
56. Atlas Aluminum Corp. v. Borden Chem. Corp., 233 F. Supp. 53 (E.D. Pa. 1965).
57. Seely v. White Motor Co., 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 403 P.2d 145 (Sup. Ct. 1965) (con•
curring opinion).
58. Id. at 28, 403 P.2d at 156.
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vant: the nature of the user of the product, the methods employed
in the article's manufacture and distribution, the types of entities
involved in the manufacturing and distributing processes, the type
of activity that the user was engaged in when the harm occurred, the
class of people to which the victim belongs, and the legal process
involved in shifting losses.
It is at least arguable that, in the absence of a miscarriage in the
manufacturing process, the maker of a drug, especially one designed to save lives, should not be subjected to liability for the
consequences to those who are harmed by its use, even if the
drug, after an experimental period, is subsequently withdrawn
from the market as an unreasonably dangerous product. Such
an imposition of liability could produce socially undesirable results by discouraging the development of new drugs, and there
may be better ways for society to compensate those who are injured during the experimental period. On the other hand, enterprisers engaged in distributing non-essential products like cosmetics may well be expected to bear the risks of any scientifically
undiscoverable dangers that are ultimately the cause of the product's
being withdrawn from the market. A ·general principle of liability
for harm resulting from scientifically undiscoverable risks, applicable
to all kinds of products and all types of makers and sellers, may be
unsound, but it does not follow that the only alternative is a general
principle of non-liability for such risks.
It may be that most victims are prepared to bear such losses or
can be educated to be willing to accept them. Moreover, if this is not
the case, then, as Judge Burke pointed out in Goldberg v. Kollsman
Instrument Corp., 59 "inherent in the question of strict products or
enterprise liability is the question of the proper enterprise on which
to fasten it." 60 It may be, for example, that the more appropriate
group to which losses from airplane accidents should be shifted is
the patrons of the airlines rather than the makers of the airplanes,
even when the accident is due to a miscarriage in the manufacturing
process. This would eliminate the time-consuming and expensive
task of allocating risks on the basis of a judicial determination of
whether the accident was due to abnormal weather conditions, a miscarriage in the manufacturing process, or a miscarriage in the use of
the aircraft. Why should an effort be made to determine whether an
accident was due to a miscarriage in manufacturing or in use if the
patrons of the airline are ultimately to bear the cost through higher
prices? It would appear that consideration has been given to only
59. 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81 (1963) (dissenting opinion).
60. Id. at 440, 191 N.E.2d at 85.
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one of several factors when courts have purportedly extended strict
liability to the makers of all kinds of products, rather than only
those intended for intimate bodily use, on the theory that it is just
as important to protect against externally caused injuries as against
injuries internally produced. That accidents should be prevented,
and that victims should have means available to safeguard themselves against injury and relieve themselves of the burdens of those
accidents that do occur are acceptable propositions, but they do not
answer the question of how best to achieve these desirable objectives.
Producers of products that are made and designed only for use
by experts and professionals may justifiably be treated different}y
from makers of products that are available to the general public.
Thus, the rules for the allocation of losses resulting from the use
of inherently dangerous prescription drugs or cosmetics, such as hair
bleaches, need not necessarily be the same as those applicable to
drugs and cosmetics obtained over the counter. Since prescription
drugs are by their very nature inherently dangerous and are known
by all concerned to be so, even though the extent of the danger may
be unknown or undiscoverable, and since they are not often utilized
except when a patient's life or health is already endangered by some
other cause, it is quite possible that it would be highly desirable to
distinguish, as at least one court has done, 61 between dealers in prescription and in non-prescription drugs.
VI.

CONCLUSION

No consideration of how the law should allocate risks of harm
occurring during the use of products is complete without a discussion of the validity of contractual arrangements for the allocation
of such losses. However, no attempt has been made here to deal with
this important problem. Moreover, except as the question has been
mentioned incidentally, nothing has been said herein about when,
if ever, liability without fault should be imposed on the maker of
products in favor of those who were not users but who were in the
zone of danger of an unreasonably dangerous product. With respect
to this problem, most courts, especially those following warranty
theories, have seen fit to disregard privity of contract only in a marketing sense and have limited recovery to those in the distributive
chain-consumers, users, and those in their immediate households.
It can safely be said that it will be quite some time before the law
pertaining to this subject becomes stabilized and predictable.
61. McLeod v. Merrell Co., 114 So. 2d 736 (Fla. 1965). The court seems to say that
the warranty of merchantability should apply only when goods are offered for con•
sumption to the public generally, and, since MER-29 was not available to the public
generally, its merchantability was not warranted.

